Contests over civil society: introductory perspectives by Hall, John A. & Trentmann, Frank
Civil Society 
A Reader in History, Theory and Global 
Politics 
Edited by 
John A. Hall 
Department of Sociology, 
McGill University, Montreal, Canada 
and 
Frank Trentmann 
School of History, 
Classics and Archaeology Birkbeck College, 
University of London 
Editorial Matter and Selection O John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann See 
Individual Chapters for O information 2005 
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this 
publication may be made without written permission. 
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted 
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence 
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 
90 Tottenham Court Road, London WIT 4LP. 
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication 
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. 
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified 
as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
First published 2005 by 
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RC21 6XS and 
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 
Companies and representatives throughout the world 
PALCRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave 
Macmillan division of St. Martin's Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. 
Macmillan@ is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom 
and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European 
Union and other countries. 
ISBN 1-4039-1 542-3 hardback 
ISBN 1-4039-1543-1 paperback 
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully 
managed and sustained forest sources. 
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
Civil society : a reader in history, theory and global politics /edited by 
John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann. 
p. cm. 
Includes bibliographical references and index. 
ISBN 1-4039-1542-3 - ISBN 1-4039-1543-1 (pbk.) 
1. Civil society. I. Hall, John A., 1949- II. Trentmann, Frank. 
Printed and bound in Great Britain by 
Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne 
Contests over Civil Society: 
Introductory Perspectives 
John A. Ha22 and Frank Trentmann 
The last years of the second millennium saw the remarkable triumph of 
'civil society'. Politicians repositioned themselves as friends of civil society; 
non-governmental organizations presented themselves as champions of 
a historic idea. The media disseminated its omnipresence. Such was the 
success of civil society, that its incorporation in academic grant proposals 
became an (almost) irresistible temptation. It became so 'universally talked 
about in tones that suggest it is a Great Good', The Economist observed in 
2001, but 'for some people it presents a problem: what on earth is it? Unless 
you know, how can you tell if you would want to join it?" Others started to 
complain of this cultural inflation and found it difficult to see 'how uncritical 
adoption and use of this term advances peoples' struggles for basic rights, 
for self-determination, liberation and decol~nisation'.~ What, then, to make 
of civil society: rediscovered thinking tool, emancipatory panacea, or new 
imperialism? A fundamental concept of civic education for pupils, scholars 
and politicians alike, or a confusion altogether, a mere multitude of competing 
tongues best kept out of 'serious' social theory and public policy? 
This volume is a critical introduction to arguments about the nature of 
civil society - past and present. Significantly, the revival of interest in civil 
society has tended to reproduce rival and competing traditions, rather than 
to promote an open, critical engagement between different moments and 
traditions across time and space. Instead of avoiding disagreement or privileging 
one essential meaning of truth, this volume seeks to turn to good advantage 
the series of debates employing and contesting civil society in order to think 
about the attractions and limitations of this concept. These contemporary 
contests are, however, only the last in a series of historical debates over civil 
society. Rather than offering one tradition or the other, this reader is the 
first to offer a selection of central debates about the concept from sixteenth 
and seventeenth-century Europe to contemporary debates across the world. 
Instead of a 'Whiggish' triumphalist account of the contemporary resurrection 
of a particular essence of the idea, this essay and this volume, then, offer 
a pathway to enter and re-evaluate civil society through its competing 
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strands, strands that always combined anxieties as well as remedies for 
problems in human relations in the modern period. 
This critical approach is complemented by a decision to broaden the 
frame of analysis in three directions. It looks beyond Britain, France and 
Germany to include imperial, post-colonial and transnational  dimension^.^ 
In decisive places it moves beyond the received canonical texts to illustrate 
the contested nature of civil society at certain historical moments. And it 
places some select documents of the diverse practices within civil society 
alongside intellectual sources. Such a critical and comparative approach, we 
hope, will make for productive reading - and re-reading - for those advocates 
and commentators on civil society who come to the debating table with 
little, selective or dogmatic knowledge of the competing traditions and 
practices of civil society as well for those scholars whose interest in the 
history of the subject rarely engages with the shifting political terrain of its 
use today. 
As in the late twentieth century, civil society moved to the centre of 
discourse in late seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe as a useful 
concept to think about problems of society and politics as well as to describe 
social formations. Its historical fortunes have risen and ebbed, seeing 
a social and global expansion in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
followed by challenges and crises resulting in its almost complete annihilation 
during the era of totalitarianism and cold war. These cycles structure this 
reader. What began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as an argument 
about civil society as political society (pp. 26-30 Hooker, pp. 30-3 Locke), 
developed in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into 
a series of competing ideas and practices about civil society as an independent 
universe, distil~ct Fom state and market. Civil society continued to be associated 
with the activities of government in some  tradition^,^ but was now comple- 
mented by an expanding sense of the relatively autonomous universe of 
civil society. How did civil society work, what produced it, what and who 
should be part of it? What are and should be its relationship to state and 
market? Did the European concept have universal characteristics and, if so, 
what were the obligations and policies for advanced societies to export civil 
society to colonial peoples? 
These questions produced different answers from different thinkers and 
social movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This 
enriched normative and political debate was accompanied and fed by the 
unprecedented historic social expansion of civil society. As with the idea, 
the world of practice expanded at different speeds and rhythms in different 
countries but there can be little doubt about the massive proliferation of 
clubs, associations, reading societies, freemasonry and informal spaces of 
civil society in the modern period, stretching from Britain to Imperial 
Russia, and from American cities to Gcrman provincial towns.' In the English 
town of Norwich in 1750, for example, every fifth male was a member of an 
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association. Some clubs were open to women. Freemasonry produced an 
international network, stretching from France with 40,000 members in 1789, 
including artisans and small traders, to administrative towns in Russia, 
where about 3,000 masons spread a new culture of philanthropy. This 
associational culture continued to expand in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, but by now the idea of civil society was beginning to 
lose its attraction and was placed under siege by more totalizing modern 
ideologies. The remarkable revival of civil society from the late 1970s 
onwards took place against the backdrop of totalitarian experience in 
Europe, dictatorship in Latin America and communism in Asia. 
This volume is structured around the ebb and flow of the concept, giving 
due attention to the competing meanings in different settings, past and 
present. At the same time, it is also an invitation to think about the European 
and global expansion of civil society. Much of the literature in the field has 
tended to observe civil society within a particular society or to explore 
a particular dimension at one moment in time. This has benefits of depth, 
but for the advocate as well as student of civil society it risks a loss of 
perspective on the changing overall contours of the civil society debate. 
Recent comparative studies and the debate over 'global civil society' prompt 
a more kaleidoscopic approach. Our purpose in this introduction is to map 
the characteristic tensions within a field of discourse, showing their presence 
and salience across time and space. The contests over civil society can be 
fruitfully viewed in terms of anxieties about difference, strains of commercial 
society, fears of totality and dependence, and the tensions between theory 
and praxis. 
Anxieties about difference 
The new mobilization of civil society in seventeenth and early eighteenth- 
century Europe, beyond the inherited classical framework of societas civilis 
sive res publica, occurred at a moment of anxiety, not confidence. The religious 
conflicts and tensions culminating in the reformation and counter- 
reformation in sixteenth-century Europe led to a more thematic exploration 
of the nature and claims of civil society as public government vis-8-vis rival 
theocratic claims of sovereignty by some protestant sects and Papacy - 
a question at the centre of Hooker's writings (pp. 26-30). The experience of 
war and civil wars across seventeenth-century Europe produced an even 
greater and more wide-ranging debate and conflict about how to cope with 
difference - difference between sects, ideas, and social groups. The eighteenth 
century is famously known as the age of enlightenment, but it is equally 
important to notice that, although diminishing, fears of conflict and of 
emotions and extremism running wild - beyond the scope of social or self- 
discipline - never altogether disappeared. Indeed, much of the growing 
emphasis on civility, on polite manners and the self-disciplining effects of 
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living in civil society, can be understood as a way of coping with an~ie t ies .~  
The pursuit of civility and the growing purchase of civil society as a way of 
viewing society here fed into each other. Civil society provided a language 
and a code of moral behaviour. Conversely, historical actors' pursuit of civility 
raised the standards, criteria and prominence of civil society as a model of 
integrating social relations peacefully. Open physical violence or confrontation 
became less acceptable as middling groups raised the norms of civility and 
the state acquired a monopoly of violence. 
Much of this dynamic revolved around shifting attitudes to the possibility 
and limits of religious toleration. Yet the relative success of toleration in 
some European societies should not be viewed entirely as a culturally pre- 
determined transformation or some sudden act of enlightenment on behalf 
of rulers and ruled. Arguably, one factor in the more tolerant atmosphere 
was the unintended consequence of great power politics. Perhaps the most 
fundamental consideration to be taken into account in this regard was the 
inability of any side in the great European wars of religion to triumph 
absolutely over its rival. The political and social import of stalemate is 
beginning to be recognized by social and political  theorist^.^ Bluntly, when 
one cannot triumph over a rival, the alternative of putting up with each 
other begins to suggest itself. This consideration should not distract attention 
from more specific mechanisms. In Britain after the revolution of 1688, for 
example, William I11 needed the political and fiscal support of dissenters 
and Catholics.~till, at the most general level, domestic toleration was the 
beneficiary of international violence between states, especially the imperial 
conflict between Britain and France in Europe and North America. 
This is not of course to say that commentators and actors were without 
vital and interesting ideas about mechanisms concerning violence and 
fanaticism internal to society. Dominique Colas's important Civil Society 
~;rrlri F~zrlnticisr~z traces some of these debates back to Luther, and then to 
Leibniz and Spinoza. Particular attention in our volume focuses on the high- 
powered difference of opinion between Hume and Smith, close friends and 
intellectual allies, uncharacteristically at odds on this occasion - albeit about 
means rather than ends. Both Hume and Smith loathed fanaticism. Hume was 
all too familiar with the power of the Presbyterian establishment that had 
blighted his chances for employment. Hume's argument is characteristically 
brilliant, and of very great interest since it sees him wobbling at a crucial 
juncture (pp. 37-43). At first sight his hope is for a diminution of enthusiasm 
within the established church - that is, the slow creation of a respectable 
pillar of society in which parsons, bishops and presbyters cease, as in the 
novels of Jane Austen, to be overly concerned with matters of belief. But 
Hurne then argues against himself. The retention of an established church 
was not in itself desirable, for its adherents would never be friends to civil 
liberty. True friends to liberty were those who had experienced sectarian 
fanaticism, and progressed beyond it. Smith's position is wholly different. 
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Sectarian fanaticism could be controlled by the market principle. Let sects 
compete with each other, for in so doing they would block dangerous 
enthusiasm in general.' 
If Smith had these fears, it is as important to note that he had hopes as 
well. Civil society within his work is best seen as a medium for forging new 
bonds of solidarity or for teaching new forms of discipline - especially if the 
social psychology described in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is read pre- 
scriptively rather than descriptively. The fact that we hate to be disturbed, 
especially by the pain of others, makes us wish not to disturb others - for we 
learn to judge our actions as if they were seen by a 'universal spectator'. 
Self-command and other-direction accordingly rule the day. Civility, 
orderliness and manners matter in this world, and most certainly militate 
against any unbridled assertion of the romantic self. 
The social and cultural realities of eighteenth-century polite society 
reflected the advancing emphasis on civil behaviour and the growing 
preoccupation, indeed obsession, with fostering virtuous behaviour and 
sensibility, but also fears of passions and sociability spinning out of control. 
Already Hooker had emphasized sociability as a key characteristic of civil 
society (pp. 29-30). The prescriptive advice circulated in new journals like the 
Spectator and the Tatler in the early eighteenth century offered the middling 
classes a blue-print to try out new recipes of self-command, sensibility and 
sympathy (pp. 53-5). The Victorian discourse of the two spheres has clouded 
a sense to which this earlier eighteenth-century culture of sociability had 
also opened new social spheres for women.1° As Millar's influential writings 
show, civil society could be seen to advance in tandem with a greater regard 
for women and their social and intellectual contribution to social life 
(pp. 55-60). Not all commentators, however, embraced the new world of clubs, 
associations and coffee houses with equal optimism. Many an eighteenth- 
century commentator made fun of the cult of clubs, an attitude well captured 
in the account of the 'Farting Club' (pp. 69-70). The Female Tatler, moreover, 
worried that coffee houses and the culture of sociability made men effeminate 
and undermined the virility of the British nation. In France, men mixed 
with women in conversation, giving them a knowledge of the world; in Britain, 
ladies were sent off to talk amongst themselves about domestic decorative 
goods (pp. 60-1). 
The concern with fanaticism underlying the eighteenth-century debate 
about sects and toleration is as present in current debates. The classic statement 
here is Gellner's account of the ability of Islam to resist secularisation 
(pp. 268-71). Gellner's argument was stated well before the emergence of 
fundamentalist Islam," but it gained widespread prominence as the result 
of the politics of Ayatollah Khomeini and of Islamic fundamentalism more 
generally. But his view has been subject to widespread criticism. Norton's 
selection in this volume is representative of thinkers who believe that those 
wishing to change the character of Islam, from a public religion of Godly 
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rule to one of private consolation, will eventually win out.12 A rather different 
and highly original critique is that of Varshney, quick to note the presence 
of a traditional and much criticized binary opposition between 'tradition' 
and 'modernity' within Gellner's account (pp. 271-5). Varshney's central 
contention is that there is far more civility within 'traditional' societies 
than is often realized. Whilst this carries weight, one wonders nonetheless 
whether a distinction ought to be drawn between tolerance before and 
tolerance after the entry of the people onto the political stage. It may be 
that the full meaning of the civil society is in the end best reserved for the 
latter.'" 
In current debates about the prospect of civil society it has been tempting 
to contrast such religious dimensions of social life in the East with a more 
secular history of civil society in the West. Such a contrast is debatable and 
disguises the ideological filtering of civil society in many liberal traditions. 
Canonical figures like Hume or Smith cannot be read on their own but 
need to be placed in the context of a rich on-going debate with competing 
versions of civil society. One such tradition, and perhaps the most widely 
disseminated and institutionally strongest version in eighteenth-century 
England, was an Anglican vision of an organic unity between civil society, 
established Christianity (Anglicanism) and monarchy. Here civil society 
was an essential arena of social trust and political stability, but always 
premised on the virtues provided by established religion. Next to Edmund 
Burke (pp. 96-g), the Rev. Thomas B. Clarke's sermon is a typical example of 
this tradition which made up the majority of titles concerned with civil 
society in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Social trust and 
reciprocity required a belief in the Supreme Being, for, as Clarke argued, 
'surely he who despises his sacred duties towards the divinity, will not 
regard his social ones towards man.' (p. 50) Lack of faith promised '[wlars 
perpetual, dissentions eternal, robbery universal.' (p. 49) Religion, not 
nature, produced a belief in social justice, these Anglican proponents of 
civil society argued." 
Even for Locke, the argument for civil society had a significant religious 
basis and offered a bounded sphere of toleration. Practical reason and Christian 
belief were inseparable. Atheism, Locke feared, would dissolve the functioning 
of practical reason, a reason that included fear of the avenging God and 
human obedience to  His Law that was the Law of Nature.'' Nor did the 
secular component necessarily gain in the Western evolution of civil society. 
In the nineteenth century, associational life was instilled, even inspired, by 
evangelicalism and pietism, and expanded into a transnational imperial 
network through missionary societies (pp. 119-28). Far from being marginal, 
abnormal or pathological, then, religion played an integral role in the historical 
evolution and exportation of European civil society. The spiritual influence 
in civil society movements in Central and Eastern Europe in the last few 
decades is not a novel development but part of this longer pattern. 
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Strains of commercial society 
The great transformation causing these anxieties was the accelerating 
expansion and new dominance of commercial society in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. The Christian tradition of political theory in the 
West had of course produced a culture of distrust for money-making as 
a distraction from the care of one's soul. But the new world of commerce 
posed an unprecedented challenge to the received tradition of republicanism, 
which stressed the virtue and virility of civic-minded propertied citizens as 
vital sources for the maintenance and defence of public life and community. 
Did commerce threaten to sap the sources of this virtuous civic culture, or 
might it produce new sources of social solidarity as well as political strength? 
In one subtle political argument civil society emerged in favourable alliance 
with this new world of commerce. Montesquieu (1689-1 755) offers a way to 
follow this tightening connection. The Persian Letters makes much of the 
personal freedoms - especially for women - of the fashionable world of 
Paris, whilst Considerations on the Greatness of the Romans shows virtue to be 
both militaristic and so strenuous as to be hard to maintain. The 'douceur' 
of commerce, its moral and civilizing effect on social and international 
relations, is the theme of The Spirit of the Laws (1748; pp. 71-5 below). 
Commerce advanced civil society by breaking through 'the barbarism of 
Europe'. Commerce here appears 'a cure for the most destructive prejudices', 
both creating 'agreeable manners' within communities and fostering peace 
between them. Trade created conditions of mutual dependence and facilitated 
an interest in and curiosity about different cultures. Or as popular radical 
supporters of Free Trade in the nineteenth century would put it more 
bluntly: a shopkeeper does not keep a handgun under the counter to shoot 
his customers. With the evangelical revival, the secular argument for the 
douceur of commerce now began to mobilize Christian thought. Had not 
God created a world of different climates and resources so as to encourage 
humans to engage in peaceful exchange? 
Yet, Montesquieu's new endorsement of commerce came with strong 
qualifications. Commerce could strengthen or weaken public life depending 
on the nature of government. Montesquieu made an important observa- 
tion that has been all too easily forgotten in de-politicized liberal and 
neo-liberal approaches to this question: the spirit of commerce united 
nations and individuals in different ways. Where people were moved only 
by the spirit of commerce, it left behind societies where 'all the moral 
virtues' ended up for sale. In monarchies, the connection between 
merchants and public affairs left behind a culture of distrust. It was only 
in 'free states', that is republican governments which had a vibrant culture 
of civic virtue, that commerce provided 'safety'. Writing against the 
background of international wars and rivalry, there is a sense here that 
nations had a choice: they might preserve their independence in the form 
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of territorial autocratic monarchies but it could also be generated by a more 
open and commercial nation. Montesquieu turned to England to find a soci- 
ety that had taken 'advantage of each of these great things at the same time: 
religion, commerce, and liberty.'16 
The dominant critic of this appreciation of commerce's civilizing potential 
was Jean Jacques Rousseau, perhaps the greatest of all modern representatives 
of the tradition of civic virtue. What mattered for Rousseau was less the lack 
of social solidarity brought by civil society than the psychic misery and 
social dependence that it inevitably entailed. Rousseau took to task writers 
who had told of a linear, triumphant progression from a barbaric and 
vicious state of nature to civil society. Far from being a site of oppression 
and human misery where people were unfree and 'continually cutting one 
another's throats to indulge their brutality' (p. 75 below), the state of nature 
was marked by equality amongst people unpolluted by luxury or notions of 
power and servitude.17 It was civil society, with the introduction of private 
property and an increasingly competitive pursuit of commercial gain, that 
introduced base motifs of domination and imitation. Before civil society, 
people could be happy with themselves; in civil society, they became slaves 
to the conventions of social tastes and habits and their happiness depended 
on the testimony of others: 'the savage lives within himself, while social 
man lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live in the 
opinion of others.' (p. 79 below) The vision of freedom in civil society, in 
other words, was far from free but embedded in power and involving the 
loss of independent consciousness. 
Commerce was an important conduit of this social pathology. Commercial 
society promoted unprecedented social differentiation - the proliferation of 
specialized tasks and skills and the transgression of inherited social orders. 
For most social thinkers what mattered here was a general feeling that 
atomization would undermine social order. This argument lies at the back 
of Hegel and Marx. It is equally present in the mind of Smith. In a beautiful 
and profound passage in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, mixing social obser- 
vation with social theory, (pp. 79-84 below), Smith accepts part of Rousseau's 
position, which he knew well, but in such manner as to go beyond 
Montesquieu's already diffident acceptance of the world of commerce. 
Smith had little doubt about the new culture of consumption unleashed by 
commerce on social groups, high and low. People had become obsessed 
with acquiring a seemingly infinite number of 'trinkets', 'frivolous objects' 
and a 'multitude of baubles'. The new commercial cultures of consumption 
made completely new people, changing their habits, appearance, their identity 
and interactions.18 'All their pockets are stuffed with little inconveniences', 
Smith observed. They even 'contrive new pockets, unknown in the clothes 
of other people, in order to carry a greater number.' (p. 80 below) The poor 
aspire to the comforts of the rich. Civil society is like a hamster-wheel where 
individuals are in an endless race for higher status and distinction. Only at 
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the end, 'in the last dregs of life', does the disappointed individual find that 
'wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted 
for procuring ease of body or tranquillity of mind than the tweezer-cases of 
the lover of toys.' (p. 81 below). Some eighteenth-century observers, like 
'Mrs. Crackenthorpe', warned of the dangerous consequences of this civil 
society in action, with its new public spaces and its obsession with ever 
more refined 'tea-cups, sugar-tongues, salt-shovels' (p. 61 below) and the 
like: British society was losing its strength as men were becoming effeminate 
in coffee houses and women were being packed off to tea parties. Smith's 
view was more subtle and highlighted the paradoxical workings of civil society. 
Individuals might have become locked into a status-seeking game paying 
more regard to what 'the spectator' thought than their own free will. Yet, 
from the perspective of civil society as a whole, this 'deception' also had 
virtuous consequences. For it was 'this deception which rouses and keeps in 
continual motion the industry of mankind' (p. 83), leading to new technolo- 
gies, better and more food, and communication between peoples. Competitive 
status-seeking and the pursuit of greater wealth also, Smith argued, carried 
a built-in mechanism for social harmony: being able to fantasize becoming 
rich made the poor person accept a culture of social inequality, rather than 
opting for violence or anarchy. Commerce and consumption, in short, created 
and stabilized a civil society. 
The debate about the relative costs and benefits of commerce for civil 
society was not resolved by the irreversible transformation created by 
industrialization. Far from it, attention to industrial society created new 
anxieties about pauperism and the loss of community and self in a society 
structured around profit, markets and a division of labour. Hegel projected 
the social consequences from a market society into the future and turned to 
corporations as a way of reinstating ethical life (pp. 129-35). This projection, 
again, should be read as documenting fears of depersonalization rather 
than as evidence of material social transformation. But it was Marx who 
took this debate one step further, building, as is well known, on Hegel, but 
also drawing on Ferguson's emphasis on the social and civic costs arising 
from the division of labour. Modern society, for Marx, had not only frag- 
mented a civic community by destroying an (admittedly idealized) organic 
unity of civic virtue and economic interest (pp. 135-8). It produced a split 
identity of the self. The economic creation of the bourgeoisie had been 
complemented by the political creation of the citizen in the French Revolution. 
In civil society, the rights of man, proclaimed by Tom Paine and revolu- 
tionaries in France and elsewhere (pp. 99-102), did not go beyond egoistic 
man. The French revolution dissolved the old society, but the freedom it 
granted was limited: man received the freedom of property and the freedom 
of trade, but was not freed from property or materialism as such. The self 
had become divided: abstract universal citizen in politics and materialistic 
individual in civil society. Full human emancipation, Marx argued, required 
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the overcoming of this division and the recognition of personal forces as 
social forces. 
There is of course a huge difference between Marx and western Marxism; 
that is, between a great theorist expecting a revolution for broadly materialist 
reasons and those descendants who explained the failure of a revolution 
to occur by stressing, not altogether in the spirit of the master, that cultural 
co-option of one sort or another had, so to speak, unmanned the working 
class. If the earliest of such thinkers was Lukacs and the most extreme 
Marcuse, the most important for our purposes was Gramsci.lg Social life was 
structured quite as much by belief as by hard realities for Gramsci, with 
revolutionary fervour being undermined by the 'hegemony' of ruling ideas 
that existed within civil society (pp. 186-90). Still, the difference between Marx 
(and then Soviet Marxists) and western Marxism does not in the most crucial 
sense really matter. For both schools wished to end atomization and to 
restore the unity of mankind. Perhaps the greatest of all critiques of what it 
meant to live under regimes that sought to remove the differentiation of 
civil society so as to re-create a simple and unified solidarity was that 
penned by Leszek Kolakowski, the great historian of Marxism who lived for 
many years in communist Poland before being forced into exile in the West. 
In conditions of social complexity inherent in any industrial society, simplicity 
can only be achieved through brute force - a brute fact which promises that 
any such programme is self-defeating (pp. 206-9). 
Late twentieth-century discussions show the on-going ambivalence 
about the pairing of commerce and civil society. Should commerce and 
markets be viewed as integral to civil society, or as a sphere of profits and 
materialism that distracts from a purer, more deliberative and higher ethical 
plane of civil society? Where today's commentators stand with regard to 
this question has as much to do with the intellectual and cultural traditions 
they bring to the rediscovery of civil society as with the material realities of 
the economy in their respective societies. Thus the normative model of 
deliberative politics developed by Jiirgen Habermas remains sceptical of the 
commercial world of consumption long criticized by his Frankfurt School 
teachers (pp. 222-6). From a more communitarian perspective, American 
commentators like Robert Putnam have viewed media culture as a key source 
of a weakening civic life in the United States (pp. 227-31). For Michael Sandel, 
media and consumer markets are potential forces of disintegration, stretching 
people's more manageable sense of belonging to distinct communities 
(pp. 196-9). Similarly, Havel's plea for 'living in the truth' was directed not 
only at a post-totalitarian socialist regime but also written from within 
a deep suspicion of the ethical consequences of mass consumption. These 
intellectual traditions, then, drew on an older critique of consumer society 
where consumers were pictured as passive, unfree servants of corporate 
firms and culture industry - an approach that ignored the many ways in 
which consumers have at times been 'active' and emancipatory agents in 
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civil society, fashioning new identities for themselves and others in the 
process.20 
It is easier to be critical of markets when one has the benefit of living with 
a market system of provision, and one reason for the sometimes passionate 
and idealistic embrace of markets by many civil society champions in Eastern 
Europe was precisely that markets held out an attractive counter-weight to 
the power of the state. Critical voices pointed out that such appeals were 
often inflated and down-played the sources of social solidarity under socialism 
(pp. 203-6, Hann). Yet, in market-based societies too, past and present com- 
mentators have highlighted the frequent (though far from automatic) 
synergies between commercial development and civil society. Conscious 
and organized consumers have often been at the forefront of social activism 
and civic engagement, from cooperatives, British Free Traders, and consumer 
leagues in America and Europe in the generations before the First World 
War, to more recent transnational consumer activi~rn.~' Far from being some 
pure autonomous sphere, John Keane argues, global civil society was in part 
fuelled by the transnational energies of turbo-capitalism (pp. 287-92). 
The current debate about the nature and future of 'global civil society' 
is an opportune moment to recall the earlier international dimension of 
this problematic relationship between commerce and civil society. After 
Montesquieu's 'douceur of commerce', a cosmopolitan strand of ethics 
emerged from within the lodges of freemasons and texts by writers like Kant 
that searched for ethical transnational bonds beyond the bonds provided by 
commercial exchange. For Kant, civil society became an attractive frame for 
administering universal justice (pp. 93-5). It is not necessary, however, to 
imagine a stark contrast between cosmopolitan unity in civil society and 
social separation in traditional society. As Lessing makes clear in his 
Masonic dialogues, freemasonry always divided as well as united different 
people (pp. 43-8). Civil society offered people a way of thinking beyond 
states, communities and ranks, but this did not mean that commentators 
were blind to the fact that division was an integral component of civil society: 
'It cannot unite men without parting them.' (p. 45) Freemasonry was diversified 
just as civil society was. 
It would be a mistake to project onto civil society a linear view of a growing 
awareness of cosmopolitan ethics and peace. Rather, the debate about ethical 
bonds uniting people in different states developed alongside a debate about 
the implications of commercial civil society for the military demands of 
states. Civil society might be nice, but how would political communities be 
able to survive and exert their will in an increasingly commercial world? 
The selections from Ferguson and Gibbon amount to an exchange about the 
necessities for military defence. No thinker is more ambivalent about the 
new world than Ferguson in his great Essay on the History of Civil Society 
(pp. 83-8). His approval of a world of polish and refinement in which virtue 
is no longer, as it was for the Spartans, the business of the state breaks down 
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when confronting questions of defence and service to the community. 
Commerce, polish and refinement will make us soft, and so unable to defeat 
nomads and tribesmen, trained by the adverse conditions of peripheries to 
be fit and blessed with military skills. His worries are all too easy to under- 
stand: Highlanders had, after all, marched through Edinburgh in 1745. 
Nonetheless, Gibbon countered this view, despite his admiration for Roman 
virtue (pp. 88-92). The world had changed. Riches now allowed us to buy 
weapons of such effectiveness that nomadic conquerors would never again 
be able to destroy the centres of civilizati'on. That is by and large the view 
held by our own generation. Or is it? Did not the assault on the Twin Towers 
of New York on September l l th  demonstrate the military effectiveness of 
outsiders? If history has not yet seen fit to answer that question, one can at 
least say that the outsiders in question believed commercial society to be 
soft and weak. 
Paradoxes of totality 
The revival of interest in the notion of civil society in the twentieth century 
has a particular flavour, somewhat removed from the fears of atomization 
and social decay noted in earlier historical moments. What has come to the 
fore now is a reaction to ideologies of all sorts that seek to make the world 
whole. Jean-Paul Sartre's account of Marxism made much of its totalizing 
ambition, and it is precisely this quality that is in question here. What is at 
issue takes us back to Rousseau, that is, the desire to re-create - or perhaps to 
create - unitary selves in a world in which self and society merge seamlessly 
into each other. Indeed, a similar position can be traced to a heated and 
bloody confrontation in Reformation Europe in the 1530s-50s when 
Luther, Melanchton and Calvin rallied to the defence of civil society against 
those rnillenarians who believed they could overcome the gulf between civil 
society and the City of God." It was modern totalizing ideologies in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries that sought to erase differences on this 
earth. In  contrast to Sartre's emphasis, Marxism was not the only totalizing 
philosophy of the modern world. Equal attention should be given to the 
ideas and practices of at least two other forces: nationalism and liberalism. 
There is no want of literature on nationalism and liberalism but, interest- 
ingly, these subjects have rarely received the recognition they deserved in 
relation to the changing dynamics and spaces of civil society. 
Instead of positioning civil society straightaway opposite fascism and 
socialism, it may be helpful to broaden the question, to ask about the more 
general pressure put on civil society - as a concept and practice - by the rise 
of new modern ideologies. This has the additional advantage of proceeding 
with a more appropriate temporal perspective on the transvaluation and 
declining significance of civil society, for it makes us look beyond the era 
of the two world wars. Clearly, the tremendous suffering caused by the 
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social and ethnic projects of fascism and socialism was the backdrop for the 
more optimistic retrieval of civil society in the 1980s-90s, but this does not 
tell us much about the history of the crisis of civil society leading up to the 
inter-war years. Fascism and socialism combined in an attempt to finish off 
civil society. Leninist policies and Lenin's rejection of the rights of man 
were a brutal version of Marx's earlier critique of the split of man into 
citizen and bourgeois (pp. 135-8, pp. 180-2). Neither was very squeamish about 
the use of violence to overcome this perceived duality and restore totality. 
Yet totalizing programmes confronted a concept of civil society that had 
already become a weak player, softened by the changing use and potential 
in modern ideologies and increasingly losing its earlier more autonomous 
strength. Guild socialism and pluralism gave civil society a new flowering at 
the turn of the twentieth century (pp. 155-73), but this was a short-lived 
spring in a generally much harsher climate which saw the overall decline of 
civil society as a moral and intellectual project in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Liberal imperialism and nationalism left their imprint 
on civil society. 
If liberalism provided an arena to explore representational aspects of 
democracy for civil society, especially at the level of local self-government, 
it also worked as an expansionist framework in which civility and imperial 
mission operated in tandem. James Mill reveals the tensions at work. Here 
was a liberal utilitarian whose long-term hopes for Indian society were 
informed by a stark opposition between the advanced moral, physical and 
institutional culture of British civil society and the barbarous, rude and 
litigious habits of the Hindu. Civil society here required trust and reciprocity, 
which required modern law. As a liberal mission for exportation, civil society 
therefore required legal and institutional transformation as well as cultural 
uplifting. Communities, and the natural environment in which they lived, 
needed acts of social reconstruction to become the realm of civil society, 
through the exercise of power as well as pers~asion.'~ It would be wrong, 
however, to see this process only in a one-directional manner. Imperial 
administrators also returned from India to Britain with new knowledge and 
questions that could make them challenge a civilizing equation between 
property-rights and a society based on ~ontract. '~ At the same time, there 
can be little doubt that colonizers and colonized had uneven positions of 
power in this relationship. Liberal Christian imperialism was less pluralistic 
than many earlier forms of European power and conversion, such as that of 
the Jesuits. Missionaries' optimistic visions of building a new society of 
brotherhood in the early nineteenth century gave way to a bleaker more 
racialized view of biologically inferior subjects in the second half of the 
nineteenth ~entury. '~ 
These imperial sources are usefully read alongside more recent post- 
colonial writings. For they show that civil society cannot be located exlusively 
within European nation-states. Civil society contained an expansionist 
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imperial strand which placed metropole and colony as interactive and 
dependent settings within the same framework. For the current debate 
about which societies have the historical qualifications for becoming 
a member of the civil society club, this means that it is problematic to 
invoke some exclusive European advantage. The imperial nature of many 
European states meant that civil society left its impact on non-European 
societies whether they wanted it or not. For the more recent debate about 
civil society in former colonies, this has had conflicting repercussions. The 
imperial flavour of earlier confrontations, made for a good deal of scepticism, 
even suspicion, leading some post-colonial writers to look to community 
rather than civil society. Anti-colonial nationalism refused to accept mem- 
bership in a 'civil society of subjects' and opted instead for its own narrative 
of community, as suggested in Chatterjee's work (p. 284). Emphasizing 
the contradictions of Western civil society and arguing against a holistic 
dichotomy between metropole and colony, the Comarroffs have argued 
that attempts to retrieve the idea of civil society for Africa need to locate 
the uncivil dimension of colonization against the specificities of local 
histories (pp. ~79-83).'~ 
Nationalism was a second ideological and social project that changed the 
trajectory of civil society. As a concept cherishing difference, civil society 
can be seen as the opposite of nationalism and, as we have already noted, 
new ideas of cosmopolitanism and new transnational networks were one 
strand in the modern history of civil society. Yet we should not ignore that 
in some contexts nationalist ideas also presented themselves as the natural 
and appropriate expression of civil society. The selection from Sieyits already 
reveals the desire for a common, unitary social will (pp. 102-5). Nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century European history generalized this desire. The 
use of civil society for the preservation of difference now moved into new 
terrain. Instead of a pluralist embrace of different ethical or normative 
positions, difference could now mean protecting different social classes and 
nations against a drift of flattening uniformity. Civil society was endorsed as 
the natural setting of social hierarchy and separation of distinct national 
cultures. 'Civil society in a rich nation is always an aristocracy, even under 
a democratic constitution,' (p. 139) emphasized Heinrich von Treitschke, 
the liberal nationalist historian and advocate of a Prussian-led united Germany. 
Civil society here stood in opposition to social liberal and social-democratic 
ideas of full civic participation, social mobility, and deliberative politics. 
Social de~nocracy represented 'unpatriotic cosmopolitanism.' Civil society 
preserved national consciousness and power. Its pillars were property, piety 
and patriotism. Much had been made by earlier writers on civil society 
about property as a starting point in the history of civil society - Locke 
importantly included property of life and person in his definition. For 
'Treitschke, property now functions not only as a defensive position against 
social redistribution, but as a resource of national identity, pride and cultural 
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diversity against a homeless, globalizing homogeneity: 'out of love to the 
inherited domestic four posts arises the noble pride of love for the fatherland 
and the certainty that the multi-faceted richness of national civilization 
shall never be replaced by the same old dull routine of a cosmopolitan 
bourgeoisie weltbiirgertum] .' (p. 139) Treitschke looked hackwards to Aristotle 
to legitimize civil society as a frame stabilizing social relations and state power 
alike by keeping 'the masses' in their place, preventing class antagonism, 
and fostering respect for the nation-state. 
There was already a good deal of suspicion of popular democracy in this 
national-liberal appropriation of civil society - the 'masses' were not fit for 
g~vernment.~' The next two generations saw a more profound, decisive 
assault on the participatory and deliberative traits of civil society. The 
attempt to exclude the people from the political arena came to an end. But 
the mobilization of the masses was not managed on liberal democratic lines; 
on the contrary, dislike of liberalism pervaded the intellectual and social 
atmosphere of the time. Parties were attacked as vehicles of sectional interest, 
not instruments of deliberate reasoning bringing out a higher rationale of 
civil society. Both Lenin and Schmitt had little trust in different groups 
being able to reach peaceful agreement through plurality and reasoning 
(pp. 180-2; 182-5). Accordingly, both bolshevism and fascism offered versions 
of the truth to which the people should be led - the key implication being 
that those who would not accept the truth were nothing less than traitors. 
The cult of leader appealed to this non-deliberative, organic imagery of the 
popular will, as evident in bolshevism as in fascism. 
If reactions to the French revolution had begun a move toward national 
awakening, geopolitical competition then suggested to many state elites that 
a more homogeneous citizen body would increase the functional capacities 
of their states. This was certainly true of late Tsarist Russia, hopeful that 
Ukrainians could be turned into Russians proper so that a multinational 
empire could become a classical nation-state. The fact that states fought 
over their peoples, that conflicts between homelands and minorities struc- 
tured politics, did much to create those fears of disloyalty that made ethnic 
cleansing such a popular force in Europe's dark twentieth century. This is 
the world in which, as Perez-Diaz put it, the state became a moral project 
(pp. 193-6). If social and national unity were state tasks, so too was the need 
for economic development - the final social force in question. The inter- 
mingling of such forces took various forms. If Hitler and Stalin between 
them did much to homogenize the populations of Eastern Europe in the 
midst of war, both were so deeply attractive to their supporters because their 
great moralities promised to give unity and meaning to life. Furthermore, 
both led to imitative strategies elsewhere. Communism is perhaps best seen 
as a late development strategy in general, but authoritarian nationalism 
equally laid claim, especially in Latin America, to be a successful late devel- 
opment strategy. 
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Life within authoritarian states armed with a moral project became in 
time unbearable. Kolakowski's writings in the mid-1970s are a particularly 
eloquent and high-powered account of why this is so (pp. 206-9). In conditions 
of social complexity, attempts to create unity between self and society must 
involve coercion - and, one can add, of nations quite as much as of classes. 
The world of civil society is accordingly one of diminished ambition, 
a world which seeks softness rather than absolute truth. This is nicely 
emphasized here by Walzer, who has approached civil society as a project of 
projects (pp. 209-12). Civil society here becomes a determination to live with 
differences. It is a common agreement, a consensual matter, that difference 
cannot be avoided. 
Certain implications follow from this. To begin with, the post-communist 
prism of anti-totality helps to sharpen our view of earlier anxieties about 
state power. The Elizabethan theologian Richard Hooker had been among 
the first systematically to explore civil society as political society and its 
relationship to the independent claims of religious groups like Calvinists 
and Papists. Here civil society was a social and political response by individuals, 
fearful of violence, delegating the protection of their interest to a 'civil 
regiment' or governing institutions (pp. 26-9). By the time of John Locke, 
a century later, the argument for civil society had broadened into a consid- 
eration of a government abusing its powers and into an argument for the 
right of resistance. Civil society was now mobilized against totalizing 
regimes like absolute monarchy. For Locke, civil society was still a political 
society, but not all political societies (such as absolute governments) were 
civil societies (pp. 30-3). Here was the paradigmatic birth of the modern 
anti-totalizing uses of the civil society argument. 
The tremendous expansion and ideological legitimation of state power in 
the late nineteenth century saw a fresh emphasis on the social spaces and 
social character of citizens. 'What we actually see in the world', J.N. Figgis 
observed on the eve of the First World War, 'is not on the one hand the 
State, and on the other a mass of unrelated individuals; but a vast complex 
of gathered unions, in which alone we find individuals, families, clubs, 
trades unions, colleges , professions, and so forth', all groups that exercised 
functions 'which are of the nature of government.' (p. 161) Debates about 
collectivism, socialism and 'mass society' produced a variety of attempts to 
protect civil society against centralizing state tendencies or collectivism. The 
answers advanced by different European thinkers and social reformers 
reflected the ways in which different national traditions viewed state, liber- 
alism and commercial society. In France, Durkheim argued that the state 
was simply too far away from the modern individual for any connection 
leading to moral integration to be established; equally, the family had 
become too small a unit to allow general integration within a society for 
a modern society with division of labour. Balance in society dependent upon 
the creation of a mid-level within society that, for Durkheim, prevented the 
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atomization of society by market forces. Professional organizations, that is, 
a modernized guild system, would be able at once to incorporate the indi- 
vidual whilst being of sufficient size to speak to and to be taken seriously 
by the state (pp. 173-9). In Germany, Gierke was more critical of guilds as 
compulsory associations and favoured a more organic image of com~uni ty  
(pp. 155-60). Tonnies used the concepts of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschafi to 
draw attention to the different modes of ideas and practice between exclusive 
social systems and more open, inclusive and market-oriented civil societies 
(pp. 152-5). But this distinction, though real, should not be overdone; for 
Tonnies the two systems were not sequential, one replacing the other, but 
co-exi~ted.~~ Cattaneots focus of concern was slightly different. Nation-state 
formation could create such homogeneity as to squeeze out minorities. 
Accordingly, he sought to find a better balance within society by championing 
federal arrangements (pp. 163-8). Differently put, political arrangements 
could be created which would further democracy in the fullest sense, by 
creating a frame within which national differences could be respected - and 
not extirpated by the false democracy wherein a simple majority could 
establish its own tyranny. The enemy for the guild socialists was rather 
different, namely the bureaucratization of the world envisioned by the 
~ e b b s . ~ ~  Socialism has indeed always been somewhat schizophrenic, being 
drawn alternately to the poles of liberty or efficiency. Cole represented 
a move towards the libertarian end of the spectrum (pp. 168-73). Any full 
consideration of his work must note, however, his ultimate inability to 
create a truly plausible constitutional arrangement for the society he so much 
wished to bring into being. 
Furthermore, there is a world of difference between a liberal tradition 
stressing difference and civility and a republican tradition of civic virtue 
always hankering after a degree of unity - or, indeed, Anglican, conservative 
and national uses of civil society equally concerned to create unity between 
church and state or between classes and nation. For consensus, albeit limited 
in scope, lies at the heart of liberalism. There is a boundedness to the liberal 
project precisely because not everything is allowed. This insight should not 
be left at the purely theoretical level. There is a paradox about the history 
of civil society. The insistence on a measure of consensus, on types of 
behaviour necessary to civil conduct within society, could be decidedly 
illiberal, as the imperial and post-colonial texts make clear, as do the 
nationalist selections where civil society becomes a bulwark against mass 
democracy. Civil society could be mobilized quite as much for expansionist 
projects that sought to minimize, overcome or erase cultural differences. 
Just as civil society was not always opposite or outside political society, so it 
was not always a 'soft' opposite to totalizing ideologies, but sometimes 
harnessed to modern ideologies themselves. Advocates in today's world do 
well not to erase these illiberal workings of civil society from their collective 
memory. 
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Praxis and theory 
Praxis and theory flow in and out of each other in the approach to civil society 
outlined above. Civil society here is always a construct of ideas and a social 
praxis that disseminates norms of civility, structures social and political 
behaviour, and informs knowledge of self and others. This reciprocal rela- 
tionship needs emphasis, since most studies or policies of civil society have 
tended to proceed from either a purely theoretical, discursive position or 
from an analysis of social action and associational practice. The selection of 
some sources detailing social practices alongside more philosophical texts 
here is therefore not merely to approach civil society from below as well as 
from above. In addition, it is an argument for a more dynamic cultural and 
political understanding of civil society that views social actors and concepts 
as interacting in the same framework. We can distinguish between two levels 
of praxis. First, there is the use of civil'society as a working tool informing 
actors' habits and views of themselves and of others, already discussed. Second, 
there is the reverse flow, that is how practices of civil society shape new 
norms and habits of political action and reasoning. 
This second level of practice concerns the benefits of social self-organization. 
The classic statement of this position is of course that of Tocqueville, the 
great exponent of the view that a taste for liberty results from the practice of 
self-government (pp. 106-16). Tocqueville's argument is more subtle than is 
often realized. In particular, he makes much of various spill-over effects. 
Political activity has the capacity to create a lively citizen body able to 
organize all sorts of spheres of social life. Equally, the lively citizens of a 
commercial world will tend to participate in political life. There is at least 
the possibility of a beneficent cycle here. Still, Tocqueville remains aware 
that commerce might yet lead to passivity and so to despotism. It is this latter 
strain that has been developed by Robert Putnam, especially when lament- 
ing the effects of television viewing (pp. 227-31). 
This modern appropriation of Tocqueville is, however, not entirely 
appropriate. On the one hand, Tocqueville is well aware that social self- 
organization by itself may in fact undermine a civil society. French politics 
had after all seen the clandestine activity of secret societies, keen to undermine 
the social order. The brilliant argument about the social and political 
conditions that ensure that groups add to civil life makes this clear 
(pp. 116-18). On the other hand, the extent to which Tocqueville changed 
his mind in his later work is not generally appreciated. His insistence on the 
potentially corrupting influence of commerce, that is, his loyalty to the tradition 
of civic virtue in general and his love of Rousseau in particular, always made 
him suspicious of popular activity. Only in his work on the French revolution 
did he come to argue that distrust, the incapacity to join together in liberty 
in the democratic age, resulted from the legacy of the old regime - which 
had so separated the classes, through a policy of divide and rule, as to make 
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it impossible for them to co-operate together (pp. 118-19). There is an 
interesting resonance here with Skocpol's assault on Putnam. She too refuses 
to blame the people. Particular background social conditions are requirdin 
order for participation and co-operation to flourish (pp. 234-7). 
The contemporary debate about changing associational habits should be 
treated as an invitation to a more complex and contingent view of associ- 
ational life in relationship to social and political identities and processes, past 
and present. The impact of associations on social and political procedures 
and mentalities does not follow along a universal equation, but is determined 
by the political traditions and cultural resources that actors bring with them 
to the clubhouse. The then unprecedented high levels of associational 
membership in Weimar Germany did not diminish the degree of violence - 
far from it.30 High levels of associational membership in today's Federal 
Republic of Germany, by contrast, coincide with peaceful, democratic culture. 
Surely, there is a world of difference between groups of men and women 
joining a voluntary automobile veterans' club and young men joining the 
stormtroopers. Philanthropy, a crucial sphere of associational culture from 
the seventeenth century to the present, often involved projects of paternalism 
and social discipline that were a far cry from the often rosy picture of pluralism 
painted today (pp. 143-6). Rather than being a natural home for deliberative 
reasoning associational life reflected the changing emotional household of 
society and culture. Evangelicalism and pietism injected an unprecedented 
emotional energy into clubs and societies, of which missionary and domestic 
reform associations made up a growing bulk in nineteenth-century Europe. 
In addition to different purposes and motivation, the political traditions 
and cultural values and resources that precirculate in society also influence 
the practices of associational life in and outside the associational meeting. 
A popular radical tradition of emancipation, for example, can provide disad- 
vantaged members of society, like Ms. Layton of the Women's Cooperative 
Guild, with a script of personal empowerment (pp. 146-9). By contrast, in 
a less vibrant democratic culture, associations can become havens of retreat 
from the complex and frightening demands of modern social and political 
life, as for the men of the turn of the twentieth-century Schlaraffia in 
Hamburg who developed an elaborate cultural world of nostalgia and 
romanticism away from mass society (pp. 149-51). Associational life can 
make for myopia and political passivity as well as for liberation and civic 
connectedness, a point well known to satirists and social observers since the 
eighteenth century (pp. 69-70; pp. 185-6). 
These limitations, ambivalences, or deficits in the high age of civil society 
in Europe are important because they suggest the need for a more open 
consideration of associational practices in other cultures today. Against the 
background of these complex, ambivalent histories, it is problematic to 
invoke a European ideal-type. Much of the debate about the prospects of 
civil society in non-European settings has been conducted on an uneven 
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debating field, comparing their social historical potential (the number of 
associations in the past, the relative openness of professional and urban 
groups, their relationship to state power, etc.) with models of the public 
sphere in eighteenth-century Europe developed by Habermas in the 1960s 
that have since been viewed more as an ideal type than as a meaningful 
representation of the more conflictuous and hierarchical and less deliberative 
processes of the multiple forms of publics at work in modern Europe.31 
Associations in China, informal neighbourhood networks in the Middle East, 
and religious groupings in India, may look less like unfamiliar potential 
members of the civil society club if viewed against European civil societies 
that recognize their social complexities, tensions, and limits. 
Conclusions 
The great revival of interest in the concept of civil society began in the 
1970s and perhaps reached something of a peak two decades later. At the 
level of global civil society, the numerical expansion of international non- 
governmental organizations in the 1990s is remarkable: transnational social 
movements (like missionary or anti-slavery movements) can be traced back 
to the early nineteenth century, but over one quarter of the 11,693 INGOs 
in existence in 2000 (and more than a third of their members) emerged after 
1990."~ These were years in which there was so visceral a reaction against 
totalizing politics that the introduction of market forces to balance state 
power seemed an unadulterated good. Recent years have seen some ques- 
tioning of the salience and usefulness of the concept of civil society. One 
worry that came to the fore concerned the nature of social groups themselves. 
Merely to strengthen group life was not to guarantee civility or decency in 
social life. 'Compelled associations', Nancy Rosenblum correctly argues, can 
be repulsive in so far as they resemble cages from which human beings 
cannot then escape (pp. 2449). Perhaps more important was the revival of 
a generalized disquiet about commerce. For one thing, there was ever greater 
awareness of the brutal consequences that had followed on privatization, 
especially in the former Socialist Bloc. More generally, the increasing intensity 
and speed of economic connections around the world threatened to so 
disrupt nations and states as to rule out of court the base of social solidarity 
upon which civil society depends. 
A change in mood should not for a moment be taken as an injunction 
to take the concept of civil society less seriously. Perhaps the most obvious 
point to be made in conclusion is that historical awareness forces us to 
see that the debates about civil society have waxed and waned, again and 
again. It is very likely that this will continue. However, before ending 
with a final note as to why that is so, it is useful to review three particular 
new insights that follow from putting together the varied texts in this 
reader. 
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We can note, to begin with, that civil society is very distinctly not the 
same, conceptually or in terms of reality, as democracy. Civil society in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not particularly well 
equipped to handle the demands or questions derived from popular politics. 
Accordingly, civil society did not lose its central position in social theory for 
no reason; indeed, on the contrary, one can argue that many thinkers in 
the tradition of civil society assembled here did not concern themselves 
centrally with democratic politics. All in all, it might not be wise to overburden 
the concept of civil society with contemporary projects of democratic 
renewal. This is not, however, to say that the concept has nothing to offer 
democratic theorists. Bluntly, it always behoves us to remember that democ- 
racy is not necessarily 'nice', as de Tocqueville so clearly realized. Fascism 
was a popular moral project, at least for a period, whilst ethnic cleansing has 
not been, as recent years have demonstrated, without its popular supporters. 
In the last analysis, democracy is only really attractive when it takes unto 
itself some of the characteristics associated with civil society. 
This particular set of readings makes us realize that non-European or 
global debates about civil society are not simply a new episode. Very much 
to the contrary: they continue to engage with many of the problems and 
debates European societies had as well - the relationship between inclusiveness 
and exclusiveness, between plurality and order, between shared religious 
and cultural values and toleration, between self-governing associations and 
their relative dependence on states and markets. Liberal and conservative 
versions of civil society CO-existed with nationalist readings. It is unwise to 
view the concept of civil society through some sort of Whiggish or evolu- 
tionary narrative of democratic perfection that advances with time. Most 
civil society ideas were developed as arguments about political society, and 
as such involved the state, be it as secular governing authority or as Christian 
state with a religious establishment. Civil society could be utilized by thinkers 
and social movements to reinforce ideas of nation-state and imperial mission 
just as much as an emancipatory idea checking the abuse of state power. 
Either way, the idea of civil society developed in tandem with, not in isolation 
from, political society broadly defined. 
Let us conclude finally by offering an explanation as to why the fortunes 
of civil society have risen and fallen over time, and why this is likely to 
remain so. The concept is, to use Bryce Gallie's useful term, 'essentially 
~ontes ted ' .~~ The idea of difference which lies at the heart of civil society has 
enormous moral attraction. Do we know everything? Are we certain that 
a particular set of standards is always correct? The fact that the answer must 
be negative suggests a degree of relativism. But we know that any full- 
blooded relativism must be repulsive, and very dangerous. So a civil society 
will always wobble between allowing difference, and insisting that such 
difference be bounded. Hence civil society must be at once an agreement, 
a consensus, and a recognition of difference. There can be no final balance 
22 Civil Society 
here, for historical forces have shifted and will continue to shift boundaries. 
We would not accept the Anglican view that all must believe in God, but 
have long accepted a great deal from the Enlightenment - the condemnation 
of slavery and the rights of man (and woman). It seems that questions of 
hu~nan rights are now altering the balance again. Civil society is not and will 
not somehow become closed and final, either theoretically or practically. 
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